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On October 12, 2001, two envelopes containing Bacillus anthracis spores passed through a sorting
machine in a postal facility in Washington, D.C. When anthrax infection was identified in postal workers 9
days later, the facility was closed. To determine if exposure to airborne B. anthracis spores continued to
occur, we performed air sampling around the contaminated sorter. One CFU of B. anthracis was isolated
from 990 L of air sampled before the machine was activated. Six CFUs were isolated during machine acti-
vation and processing of clean dummy mail. These data indicate that an employee working near this
machine might inhale approximately 30 B. anthracis-containing particles during an 8-h work shift. What
risk this may have represented to postal workers is not known, but this estimate is approximately 20-fold
less than a previous estimate of sub-5 µm B. anthracis-containing particles routinely inhaled by asymptom-
atic, unvaccinated workers in a goat-hair mill. 
n the fall of 2001, 22 cases of anthrax were confirmed or
suspected throughout the eastern United States as a result
of bioterrorist release of Bacillus anthracis spores (1). Ten
cases (seven inhalational and three cutaneous) occurred in
workers at postal facilities in which envelopes contaminated
with B. anthracis spores were processed by high-speed sorting
machines. Two contaminated envelopes passed through a sort-
ing machine at the United States Postal Service Processing and
Distribution Center in Washington, D.C. (Brentwood mail
facility), on the morning of October 12. The facility was
closed on October 21 after anthrax infection was diagnosed;
four employees were eventually confirmed as having inhala-
tional anthrax (2). During the 9-day period while the facility
continued to operate, >2,000 employees processed >60 million
pieces of mail. In addition to the primary aerosol to which
workers may have been exposed, they may have had continual
reexposure to B. anthracis spores during this period. 
At the time of the anthrax release in the fall of 2001, little
was known about the re-aerosolization potential of B. anthra-
cis spores after initial dispersion. Much of what was known
came from studies conducted by the United States and Cana-
dian military biological defense programs, using surrogate bio-
logical agents dispersed outdoors at very high concentrations
(105–108 agent-containing particles/m2). These studies showed
that re-aerosolization can occur, but risk is considered to be
low (3,4). No information was available to answer similar
questions about re-aerosolization risk in an indoor occupa-
tional setting such as a postal facility.
To address the question of continued risk for workers, we
conducted an expanded safety evaluation of the partially reme-
diated mail facility. A stamp on one of the two contaminated
envelopes indicated that it had passed through Delivery Bar
Code Sorter machine no. 17 at the Brentwood mail facility.
This sorter, which had been idle for >2 weeks, had been
cleaned with 0.5% hypochlorite solution before our testing.
We evaluated the potential health risk to workers near that
sorter by activating it and conducting surface and air sampling. 
Methods
Surface Sampling
Two surface sampling techniques were used. Rodac plates
(65-mm tryptic soy agar [TSA] plates; Becton-Dickinson,
Franklin Lakes, NJ) were pressed onto the surface being sam-
pled. Immediately adjacent to the Rodac sampling site, swab
sampling was performed with sterile rayon-tipped swabs
moistened with a 0.5-mL solution of phosphate-buffered saline
+ 0.05% Tween 20 (PBS Tween). An approximately 100-cm2
area was swabbed with sequential vertical, horizontal, and
diagonal strokes. The swabs were individually placed in ster-
ile, dry 15-mL conical tubes. Sampling focused on areas in the
machine (electrical components, beneath belts, etc.) that were
unlikely to have been cleaned with the topical bleach applica-
tion. 
Air Sampling
The ventilation system in the mail facility was turned off
when the facility closed, and the system remained off during
testing. We were unable to simulate the “blow-down” proce-
dure (used to clean the sorter) during testing because the air
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compressors for the air hoses had lost power. Machine opera-
tors typically use high-pressure hoses several times a day to
clean accumulated dust and debris between mail-sorting runs.
Two banks of 10-slit samplers were placed on two postal trol-
leys (approximately 5 feet above the floor) and connected to a
vacuum pump. The slit sampler intake ports were approxi-
mately 10 inches above the trolley. Each of the samplers was
loaded with 150-mm TSA plates. Slit sampler set “A” (SSSA)
was placed next to the operator’s station (at a location and
height where workers would spend most of their time), and slit
sampler set “B” (SSSB) was placed at the opposite end of the
sorter (Figure 1). To measure the temporal patterns of re-aero-
solization, the samplers operated sequentially; the intake port
of slit sampler no.1 was opened, allowed to run for either 1
min (SSSA) or 2 min (SSSB), and then closed. Then slit sam-
pler no.2 in the set was activated, and so on, until all 10 slit
samplers in the set had been sequentially activated. The rate of
air flow through each of the slit samplers was 33 L/min.
SSSB was activated and ran for 20 min while the sorter
was turned off. SSSA was then activated and ran for 10 min.
The plates were removed from all slit samplers and new plates
were loaded. The SSSA and SSSB design characteristics
determined the duration of sampling.
Both sets of slit samplers were activated simultaneously
while the sorter was inactive. Approximately 1 min later, the
sorter was started, and clean dummy mail was processed. After
several false starts, continuous operation was achieved in
approximately 2 min. The operation of the sorter was inter-
rupted several times by jammed envelopes and quickly
restarted each time, until the machine was turned off 1 min
before the end of the 20-min sampling period. Postal officials
reported that false starts, jamming, and restarting are common
during routine operation of the machine.
As with the previous sampling, SSSA ran for 10 min and
SSSB ran for 20 min. The plates were removed from the slit
samplers and sealed in plastic bags. The bagged plates were
taken out of the facility and the exteriors of the bags were
decontaminated with 0.5% hypochlorite solution.
Mask Filters
The sampling team was outfitted with Canadian military
C4 respirators with C7 canisters. The mask was equipped with
37-mm glass fiber collection filters mounted on the inlet port
of the C7 canister, so that the entire inspirational volume of the
investigators was sampled. The masked team members were
located near the sorter to provide additional point sampling of
respirable aerosol during the experiment. Team members were
stationed at different work sites along the sorter and elsewhere
in the facility to serve as point detectors. All mask filters were
worn for at least 2 h. 
Sample Handling and Processing
Environmental swabs and TSA plates from the Rodac
plates and slit samplers were stored at 4°C until shipped and
processed. All specimens were shipped at room temperature
overnight to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Swabs were placed in 1.5 mL PBS-Tween and vortexed for
approximately 1 min. The solution was heat-shocked at 65°C
for 30 min, and 100 µL was plated onto a sheep blood agar
(SBA) plate. Rodac and slit sampler plates were incubated for
approximately 12 h, and CFU were counted by visual inspec-
tion. All colonies suspected to be Bacillus spp. were subcul-
tured on SBA plates. Identification and confirmatory testing of
B. anthracis were done according to standard microbiologic
procedures (5). The mask filters were removed in the facility
and placed in sterile glass tubes. After transport, they were
suspended in 3 mL of heart infusion broth and incubated at
35°C for 36 h, after which 10 µL of broth was plated onto SBA
plates. The filters and remaining broth were heat-shocked at
65°C for 30 min, and 10 µL was plated onto SBA plates. 
Statistical Analysis
Numbers of colonies detected in air sampling before and
after the machine was activated were assessed with a one-
sided one-sample test for difference in rates from a binomial
distribution by using StatExact 4 v. 4.0.1. (Cytel Software
Corp., Cambridge, MA). 
Results
Surface Sampling
Surface sampling was done by two methods, Rodac plates
and premoistened swabs, to establish that the machine was still
contaminated with viable B. anthracis spores. Ten Rodac plate
samples and 10 swab samples were taken on the sorter sur-
faces. Both the Rodac plates and swabs yielded growth of
CFUs that were too numerous to count at 7 of the 10 sites. Two
additional Rodac plates were positive with low levels of con-
tamination (1 and 3 CFUs); these locations were negative by
the swab method (Figure 1). Figure 1. Sites and results of surface sampling for Bacillus anthracis
with Rodac plates.BIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
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Air Sampling
A single colony of B. anthracis was identified on one of
the SSSA plates (Figure 2) during 10 min of sampling before
the sorter was activated. No B. anthracis was identified on any
of the SSSB plates during the 20 min of sampling. 
After the sorter was activated, SSSA and SSSB ran for 10
min and 20 min, respectively. A single colony of B. anthracis
was identified during minute 10 of sampling by SSSA (Figure
2; Table). SSSB identified a single colony of B. anthracis at
each of minutes 1, 5, 7, 8, and 19. 
Five investigators wore mask filters while the sorting
machine was inactive; four investigators changed to new mask
filters while the sorting machine was active. All mask filters
were negative by culture. 
Discussion
New questions have arisen as public health authorities
have investigated and responded to the intentional release of
B. anthracis in the United States. Studies by Canadian investi-
gators with a sophisticated preparation of Bacillus globigii
have shown that a contaminated envelope may, even
unopened, cause a substantial primary aerosol event (6). In
light of this new appreciation, we investigated whether, after a
remote contamination event and initial decontamination, a
Delivery Bar Code Sorter machine could be a continual source
of aerosolized B. anthracis spores and, if so, whether the parti-
cle concentration in the air could be estimated. 
Initial reports indicated that no specific remediation had
yet been undertaken on the contaminated machine. Subse-
quently, we learned that the surface of the sorter implicated in
processing the contaminated envelopes had been cleaned with
0.5% hypochlorite solution. We proceeded with testing
because the expectation was that topical cleaning would pro-
vide only fractional decontamination of a contaminated
machine. By focused sampling, we found that, despite topical
cleaning, the sorter remained contaminated with B. anthracis.
By either swab technique or Rodac plates, 9 of 10 sites on the
machine were positive and 4 sites produced B. anthracis colo-
nies that were too numerous to count. 
Air sampling detected B. anthracis before and after the
sorter was activated. Before the sorter was turned on, the sam-
plers detected a single B. anthracis-containing particle (0.0010
agent-containing particles per liter of air [ACPL]). Six colo-
nies of B. anthracis (0.0061 ACPL) were identified in the 990
L of air sampled after sorter activation. The difference
between the number of B. anthracis-containing particles
detected by the samples collected as background and those
collected after the sorter was activated was not significant at
the 0.05 level (p=0.06); however, analysis suggests a trend
toward a significant increase. 
Environmental surface sampling done shortly after the
Brentwood mail facility was closed found widespread contam-
ination of the facility with B. anthracis (7). Both aerosoliza-
tion of B. anthracis spores and direct cross-contamination of
surfaces were considered likely mechanisms for contamina-
tion. Approximately 30 h of air sampling with open-faced 37-
mm mixed cellulose ester filters (0.8-µm pore size) was nega-
tive. The previous report of negative air sampling despite
extensive testing suggests our detection of airborne B. anthra-
cis while the sorter was inactive may have been spurious and
possibly related to investigator activities while the experiment
was being set up.
Based on these concentrations and assuming 100% sam-
pler collection efficiency, the estimated number of B. anthra-
cis–containing particles that a worker might inhale near this
activated sorter can be calculated. If we assume a normal ven-
tilation rate (10 L/min), during 8 h working around this par-
tially cleaned, but still contaminated sorter, a worker might be
expected to inhale approximately 30 B. anthracis-containing
particles. This finding of very low-level airborne B. anthracis
contamination is supported by the negative testing of the mask
filters. If all the airborne particles are assumed to be of optimal
size for inhalation, this estimate is approximately 100-fold less
than the lower boundary of the 50% lethal dose estimates for
inhalational anthrax in nonhuman primate studies (8). This
number is also approximately 20-fold less than estimates of
the number of routinely inhaled B. anthracis–containing parti-
cles from a 1960 study of asymptomatic, unvaccinated work-
ers in a goat-hair mill in Pennsylvania (9). In that study,
investigators calculated that, in an 8-h workday, workers
Table. Results of air sampling after Delivery Bar Code Sorter machine no. 17 was activated
T i m e  ( m i n ) 12345678 91 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0
Sampler A +a
Sampler B + + + + +
a+, positive for Bacillus anthracis CFU.
Figure 2. Bacillus anthracis air sampling: Slit Sampler Set A collected
air samples for 10 min before and 10 min after the mail sorter was
turned on. Slit Sampler Set B collected for 20 min during each period.
Total air-flow rate, 33 L/min in both samplers.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002 1047
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inhaled >1,300 viable B. anthracis-containing particles, 510 of
which were <5 :m in size. Thus, although detected in the
Brentwood facility, airborne contamination was at a relatively
low level. 
The comparison of this type of exposure with nonhuman
primate anthrax data and historical industrial anthrax data is
problematic for several reasons. Our understanding of human
infection risk at very low-dose B. anthracis exposures is lim-
ited, as illustrated by the death from inhalational anthrax of an
elderly Connecticut woman for whom no exposure could be
determined, despite extensive environmental testing of her
home and areas she frequented (1). A well-known contributor
to the rate of alveolar deposition of a bioaerosol is the particle
size distribution; because the slit sampling method does not
measure the aerodynamic particle size distribution, we were
unable to measure this attribute. Finally, historical compari-
sons to goat-hair mill workers are limited by the unknown con-
tributions of prior host immunity, incomplete surveillance, and
the lack of additional environmental sampling data other than
the study from Pennsylvania. 
This study shows that a mail sorter may remain contami-
nated, as indicated by surface sampling, many days after pro-
cessing B. anthracis–contaminated letters and despite topical
bleach cleaning. In addition, even after processing >1.2 mil-
lion subsequent letters, as this sorter did, aerosolized B.
anthracis–containing particles can still be detected around a
contaminated sorter when active, at a level likely increased
over background levels. At the time of our study, the level of
B. anthracis–containing particles around this contaminated
sorter at Brentwood was low, but any level of aerosolized B.
anthracis spores is undesirable in this occupational setting. 
Further studies are essential to define the risks of inhala-
tional anthrax in the settings of both primary and secondary
aerosolization of B. anthracis spores. In anticipation of poten-
tial future B. anthracis exposures, re-aerosolization potential
should be evaluated in other environments, such as an office
setting. In addition, size stratification of the re-aerosolized
portion of a primary release should be part of any testing, to
give some guidance as to risk stratification for exposed per-
sons. Finally, better understanding of human health risk of
low-dose exposure of B. anthracis spores is critical to guide
optimal public health response.
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